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Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part I
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Howard G. Coombs
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ABSTRACT: This article reflects on the evolution of Canada’s
whole-of-government approach in the context of international
cooperation in Afghanistan. Although the effort resulted in great
gains when Canadian Forces were actively involved in combat roles,
the nation does not seem interested in maintaining the capability
as a framework for quickly responding to current or future international crises.

P

olitical scientist Stephen M. Saideman captured the incomplete
state of Canada’s post-Afghanistan learning with this simple
advice: Canada should “not to do it again.”1 Five years after
the commitment ended, national introspection has been left to scholars
attempting to understand the consequential changes. To comprehend the
modifications resulting from Canada’s experiences in Afghanistan, one
must understand the shifts that occurred within the government during
the conflict and then scrutinize the outcomes.2 Finally, reflection can
occur to determine if the efforts changed how Canada engages in postAfghanistan missions and if there are lessons that have been learned
and implemented.3
The unprecedented level of interdepartmental cooperation and
involvement that was necessary to advance objectives in Afghanistan
obviously made the effort unique. By the end of the combat mission
in 2011, needs for integrated strategic coordination, planning, and
guidance, as well as requirements for interoperational departments were
accepted and applied. These were necessary to produce integrated effects,
or impacts, in the mission area. Notably, other countries involved in this
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment, such as the
United States, faced similar challenges, which also resulted in adaptation
and innovation. This article demonstrates that, despite Canada identifying
and implementing these lessons during the Canadian combat mission
The author would like to thank Brigadier-General (Retired) Serge Labbé, Colonel (Retired)
Brett Boudreau, Major-General (Retired) Terrence “Terry” Liston, and Ms. Lindsay Coombs.
1      Stephen M. Saideman, “Lessons of History: What the Afghanistan Mission Teaches Canada,”
International Journal 72, no. 1 (March 2017): 131.
2      Saideman, “Lessons of History,” 131.
3      The exception to this has been the ongoing Canadian Army Training and Doctrine Centre
tactical lessons-learned project, which has produced a series of analytical and, where possible,
scholarly monographs for the Canadian Army examining the “major lessons from our Kandahar
operations by Corps and Capability.” See Lee Windsor, “Lessons Learned for Soldiers: The
Royal Canadian Infantry Corps in Afghanistan,” Dispatches 17, no. 1 (December 2013): ii; and Lee
Windsor, David Charters, and Brent Wilson, Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada’s Afghan
Mission (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 279.
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in Afghanistan, the interagency, or whole-of-government, learning
activity has not been integrated into national and international activities
in the post-Afghanistan era. Ultimately, these “lessons identified” are
not “lessons learned.” This lapse may have a deleterious impact on the
ability of the Canadian government to address the challenges of such
interagency cooperation in current and future interventions.

Afghanistan and Canada

Canada’s early involvement in Afghanistan was depicted by Canadian
researchers, Janice Gross Stein and J. Eugene Lang in their 2007 work,
The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. Initially, Canada’s participation
was to be limited to a post-9/11 combat mission in tandem with the
United States during 2002. But this led to a much longer Canadian
involvement in Afghanistan. The initial commitment of a light infantry
battalion group within a United States Army brigade was followed with
more than three successive years of continued involvement in the Afghan
stabilization mission. In 2003, Canada generated the headquarters for
a multinational brigade and an infantry battle group based in Kabul.
The following year, Canadians assumed command of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
These obligations were succeeded by what was supposed to
be provincial stabilization and capacity building that included
establishing the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).
By 2006, Canadian Forces had inexorably migrated into participation in
low-intensity conflict through counterinsurgency operations.4 Canada’s
role changed again in 2011 as it shifted from fighting in southern
Afghanistan to giving advice and assistance within the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan. By the end of the involvement in 2014, there were
165 Canadian deaths (158 soldiers, 7 civilians) and more than 1,800
wounded soldiers.5
The mission also tested the defense, diplomacy, and development
approach created in 2003 as Canada expressed its foreign policy in
conflicted regions.6 This concept evolved into the ideas represented by
the more inclusive “whole-of-government” expression of integrating all
instruments of governance and development to produce a desired effect
linked to national strategy. The growth of this integrated approach to
the conflict in Afghanistan was well recognized by the end of Canada’s
final year in Kandahar. Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated:
Friends, behind every girl now in a classroom, behind every healthy baby
in its mother’s arms, behind every farmer who can feed his family without
taking up arms, behind all of this progress are innumerable acts of heroism,

4      Janice Gross Stein and J. Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto,
ON: Penguin Canada, 2007), 1–229, 244–45.
5      Stephen Azzi and Richard Foot, “Canada and the War in Afghanistan,” Canadian
Encyclopedia, accessed July 15, 2019; and Brett Boudreau, email message to author, May 19, 2019.
6      Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 107–8.
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of selfless devotion to duty by you, the men and women of the Canadian
Armed Forces, our diplomats and our aid workers.7

Ultimately, if any discernable lessons arose for Canada from this
conflict it was those associated with this methodology. The rebuilding
of Afghanistan required integrating the efforts of those involved with
defense, diplomacy, and development to achieve positive and lasting
results in regenerating this war-torn nation.8

Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations

Canada’s intergovernmental efforts in Afghanistan evolved from
nascent beginnings. The foundation of this campaign was laid in
January 2004 when then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, the Canadian
commander of the ISAF rotation V (ISAF V), entered into discussions
about national challenges with President Hamid Karzai, who was leading
the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). They identified the lack
of unified action by Afghanistan, Canada, international community
members, and NATO toward rebuilding Afghanistan. Without a
common plan or a coordinating mechanism, the lack of coherency was
weakening the potential of many positive nation-building outcomes. The
lack of a shared approach also prevented ISAF V from moving beyond
lower-order (tactical) military activities that could achieve immediate
effects to higher-level, enduring strategic objectives.9
Hillier understood that without a coherent strategic concept that
allowed all involved parties—military, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, donor institutions, the international
community, and most importantly the ATA and Afghan people—to
participate, no operational-level campaign could be created.10 He also
believed “rebuilding failed states or failing states was not a security,
governance or economic problem; it was all three.”11 Accordingly, he
used his ISAF V staff, and later two Canadian officers with advanced
planning backgrounds who were specifically tasked with assisting the
7      Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada,” Canada, May 31, 2011.
8      Kimberley Unterganschnigg, “Canada’s Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan—
Lessons Learned,” Canadian Military Journal 13, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 16. The importance of Hillier’s
role in the degree and form of Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan cannot be understated. Stein
and Lang, Unexpected War, 1.
9      The Afghan Transitional Authority was the temporary governing body of Afghanistan
put in place by Loya Jirga, or traditional Afghan grand assembly, in June 2002; it lasted until
national elections in October 2004 confirmed Karzai’s continuance as president. See Richard J.
Ponzio, “Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” Global
Governance 13, no. 2 (April–June 2007): 260–63.
10      Howard G. Coombs and Rick Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying
Operational Art in Post Conflict Afghanistan,” Canadian Military Journal 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2005):
5–14. Hillier made many efforts to engage Canadian government support for his interagency
approach during this time with some local success amongst Canadian officials, but not to the same
degree back in Canada.
11      Rick Hillier, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War (Toronto ON:
HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2009), 389; and Serge Labbé, interview by the author, June 6,
2019. Labbé, the deputy chief of staff to Hillier’s headquarters, highlights Hillier’s emphasis on an
interdepartmental approach as part of the mission, as well as his efforts to implement this within
ISAF and through NATO Senior Civilian Representative Hikmet Çetin. Sadly, these ISAF efforts
to engage NATO in a holistic approach did not seem to persist beyond Hillier’s departure in 2005.
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Afghan Transitional Authority, to begin articulating a strategic concept
released as “Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and
Stability in Afghanistan.” Though developmental, it specified ideas that
were used to assist with developing governance and security. The core
ideas later emerged within the Afghanistan National Development Strateg y, an
overarching Islamic Republic of Afghanistan policy document guiding
the multiple activity streams working to rebuild Afghanistan.12
Recognizing the success of this effort, Karzai requested similar
support after Hillier became the chief of the Canadian Defense Staff
(CDS). Regrettably, this Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan only
ran from 2005 to 2008, roughly the duration of Hillier’s tenure in the
role. Since capacity building and assistance was not viewed by some in
the former Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade as a Canadian military mission, it met its untimely demise as a
result of interdepartmental politics.13
The termination of the strategic advisory team indicated the early
challenges Canada faced in producing a whole-of-government approach.
Difficulties ranged from orchestrating processes between different
organizations, to overcoming uneasiness with civil-military cooperation,
to calming outright hostilities and suspicions.14 This friction translated
into less than stellar results—for example, British General Sir David
Richards, who commanded the ISAF in 2006, observed that it took
months for Canada to deliver nonmilitary assistance in regions of
Kandahar that had been affected by intense fighting. This delay
exemplified the need for a whole-of-government approach to ensure the
immediate gains of military forces could be followed with stabilizing
effects from governance and development.15
Over the course of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, there were
two heavily debated parliamentary votes—one in May 2006 and the
other in March 2008—concerning the extension of the mission and its
essential character.16 The latter debate was informed by the results of the
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan convened by
the Conservative Party in 2007 to make recommendations on Canada’s
involvement in the mission. Based upon the interviews and the associated
research, the panel conducted to consider the Afghan, Canadian, and
allied perspectives, the Manley Report stated any recommendation would
need to take the following factors into account: Canadian efforts and
progress made to date in the course of stabilizing the security situation
12      Coombs and Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in
Post Conflict Afghanistan,” 5–14.
13      Michel-Henri St-Louis, “The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan—Part of the Canadian
Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 3 (2009): 58–67.
14      Tara Holten et al., “The Relationship between Non-Governmental Organizations and the
Canadian Forces,” in Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive
Approach, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal, ON: School of Policy Studies and
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 218–23.
15      Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 272; 259–83.
16      Geoffrey Hayes, “Canada in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Transition under Threat, ed.
Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2008), 292–94.
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in Afghanistan; the significant investment of resources, energy, and
infrastructure already made by Canada; the possibility of deterioration
in the security as well as the development aspects of potential future
options; NATO and United Nations (UN) objectives to create better
conditions for Afghans and prevent the reestablishment of terrorist
groups in Afghanistan; and Canada’s reputation internationally.
The report outlined a few possible options regarding the level of
continued Canadian engagement in Afghanistan during 2009 that ranged
from leaving the Afghanistan mission to continuing full involvement
as well as variations between these two extremes. But it ultimately
concluded—considering Canadian efforts and sacrifice to date, NATO
and UN commitments, and the need to make life better for Afghans—
Canadian involvement should continue. The findings raised fundamental
questions: “How do we move from a military role to a civilian one, and
how do we oversee a shift in responsibility for Afghanistan’s security
from the international community to Afghans themselves?”17
The Manley Report argued security forces needed to be strengthened,
agriculture encouraged, government institutions strengthened, and
national infrastructure restored. The Canadian portion of this plan
could only be achieved through a holistic governmental approach
with clear benchmarks that supported the “Afghanistan Compact”
on achieving peace and security in Afghanistan and a body for
strategic-level coordination, assessment, public reporting, and achieving
these integrated objectives.18
Hillier notes an important outcome of this period of debate
in Canadian politics was the development of a defense policy that
provided the overarching strategy for the use of Canada’s military.19 The
Canada First Defence Strateg y mandated the Canadian Forces “be a fully
integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in
partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel
of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team
will constitute a key element of a whole-of-government approach to
meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.”20
Furthermore, this very public political debate created recognition
of the breadth and complexity of the Afghan challenge, which in
turn contributed to a substantial evolution in both the strategic
whole-of-government coordination framework in Ottawa as well as the
corresponding mission structure and civilian resourcing in Afghanistan.
The Manley Report, and the new defense policy, ushered in a new
Canadian political perspective on the whole-of-government concept.
17      John Manley, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa, Ontario:
Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and Government Services of Canada, 2008), 8.
18      “The Afghanistan Compact” (agreement, London Conference on Afghanistan, January
31–February 1, 2006).
19      Hillier, Soldier First, 470–71.
20      Canada, Department of National Defense (DND), Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa,
Ontario: DND, 2008), 3–4.
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Resultantly, by early 2008, Canadian efforts in Afghanistan were,
for the first time, overseen by a cabinet committee on Afghanistan
that was supported by the newly created Afghanistan Task Force in
the Privy Council Office. The activities of the Afghanistan Task Force
were reported by the clerk of the Privy Council directly to the prime
minister and supported the Cabinet committee. Although mainly
staffed by senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, the task force included representatives from several
other departments including the Department of National Defense
and the Canadian International Development Agency. This whole-ofgovernment innovation was a first in Canadian political affairs.21
In March 2008, the Canadian government unveiled a detailed set
of six whole-of-government policy objectives for the mission derived
from the Manley Report and the “Afghanistan Compact.” These were:
“Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a
more secure environment and promote law and order; strengthen Afghan
institutional capacity to deliver basic services; provide humanitarian
aid to vulnerable people; enhance border security with facilitation of
Afghan-Pakistani dialogue; help advance Afghanistan’s democratic
governance; and facilitate Afghan-led political reconciliation.”22
Benchmarks were developed to help report on the progress
achieved on key priorities that included four regional objectives for
Kandahar and two national objectives for Afghanistan. The first
regional measure, a secure environment and establishment of law and
order would be accomplished by building the capacity of the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police. Supporting efforts were
identified in the areas of justice and corrections. Second, jobs would be
created, education would be provided, and essential services, such as
water, would be made available. Third, humanitarian assistance would
be delivered to people in need. Fourth, the management and security
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would be improved. The national
measures included encouraging Afghan institutions that were central
to Canada’s Kandahar priorities and supporting democratic processes
such as elections. The ultimate objective was that the Canadian efforts
would contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at
weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.23
Subsequently, these six policy objectives and their corresponding
efforts facilitated the integration of Canadian officials into Canadian
21      Nicholas Gammer, “Integrating Civilian-Military Operations: The Comprehensive
Approach and the ATF Experience, 2008–2009” (conference paper, Canadian Political Science
Association Conference, University of Alberta, Canada, June 13–15, 2012); and BrigadierGeneral Dean Milner, OMM, CD, Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10, “Helping
Afghans Secure a Brighter Future ROSHANA SABAH” (presentation, Conference of Defense
Associations in Ottawa, Ontario, June 18, 2010).
22      Canada, Privy Council Office, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Quarterly Report to
Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2010 (Ottawa, Ontario: Government of Canada,
2010), 2–3.
23      “Backgrounder: Canada’s Six Priorities in Afghanistan,” Government of Canada, accessed
May 7, 2009.
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military operations. It was the expression of political interest in and
the coordination of a comprehensive governmental approach through
the Privy Council Office and the Cabinet. This teamwork was further
encouraged by the requirement to provide corresponding detailed
quarterly assessment of activities to the Parliament of Canada. As a
result, by the end of the combat mission, this whole-of-government
process included not only the Canadian Forces, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and National Trade, and the Canadian International
Development Agency, but also other government departments like the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Correctional Service of Canada.24
It should be noted, however, that even with increased harmonization
among the efforts of all partners throughout this time, strategic
communications and public affairs remained inconsistently visualized
and carried out by the various participants. Former Director of
Communications of the Afghanistan Task Force Colonel Brett Boudreau
observed the coordination structures created when the task force was
established had a positive impact:
This forcing function to work together better, faster and in a more integrated
fashion over time showed real value from a policy and communications
perspective both in theatre and at respective departmental [headquarters]
HQs—it is perhaps why public support for the mission and particularly for
“the troops,” remained generally consistent even in the face of a significant
number of Canadian killed and wounded, as well as the considerable financial
cost. By 2012 though, after a major national effort of 10 years, the lack of
positive results or much substantive evidence of real progress on the ground
coupled with the public perception that NATO (excepting the [United
States], [United Kingdom] and Netherlands) had “abandoned” Canada in
the South during heavy fighting there, continues today to negatively impact
Canadian public perceptions of the Afghanistan mission.25

From this, one could opine that the strength, and the weakness,
for the Canadian mission over these years was its overarching focus
on building Afghan capacity. As much as the international community
collectively underestimated the strength of the insurgency, it overestimated
the ability of Afghan leadership, in governance and in security efforts, to
assume full responsibility for responding to the challenges posed by the
insurgency. Under these circumstances, Canadian activities in Kandahar
revolved around balancing efforts to enable Afghan civilian authorities
and security forces, while at the same time neutralizing the insurgents.
With the success of the 2007 American military surge in Iraq and the
renewed commitment to ISAF after President Barack Obama was elected
in 2008, the United States became reinvested in the dilemmas of the
ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Americans provided
a strategic vision and the resources necessary to create a multinational
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. With an influx of tens of
thousands of American troops, and more clearly defined international
24      Milner, presentation; and Howard G. Coombs, “Whole of Government Operations by
Task Force Kandahar September 2010 to July 2011,” (presentation, Conference of Defense
Associations in Ottawa, Ontario November 3, 2011).
25      Brett Boudreau, email message to author, May 16, 2019.
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objectives in late 2009, the various national campaigns became more
fully integrated into a broader international counterinsurgency and
nation-building campaign. Taken as a whole, this improved strategic
coherence—on top of the flow of American personnel and material—
renewed international interest in Afghanistan and gave fresh impetus
to NATO efforts to resolve the expanding violence. It was within this
increased security context that a relatively robust Canadian whole-ofgovernment approach developed in Kandahar province and the role of
the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team evolved.26
In 2008, NATO created a similar comprehensive approach. In 2009,
General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of the ISAF, identified
a lack of coordination between military and nonmilitary operations as
inimical to achieving ISAF security objectives. As a result, many of
the major nonmilitary organizations operating in Afghanistan met for
a conference in Kabul in 2010. Mark Sedwill, NATO’s senior civilian
representative in Afghanistan, then raised the issue of implementing an
effective comprehensive approach and the necessity of a NATO-level
coordination mechanism through the NATO Senior Civilian Representative
Report: A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan. The ideas
put forward by Sedwill never came to fruition and arguably the ability
of ISAF to facilitate the provision of a secure environment was, in
turn, diminished.27

Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team

The objectives in the Manley Report were achieved as Canada
exercised the whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan at the
regional and national levels during the final year of the combat mission.
Quarterly reports by the Afghanistan Task Force kept the Canadian
government apprised of the progress. The reconstruction team,
which had become a combined Canadian-American effort, included
62 Canadian civilians. The group worked closely with Afghanistan’s
governing structure, through the Office of the Provincial Governor,
the Provincial Ministries, and the Provincial Council, to identify and to
support the implementation of priority projects throughout the region.
The Canadian staff in this organization was comprised of diplomats,
aid workers, corrections officers, and civilian police who shared the
mission of reconnecting Kandaharis with an effective, representative
government. In support of these efforts the reconstruction team
collaborated with Canadian Forces, American civilian and military
partners, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The group partnered
with the Attorney General’s Office and the Provincial Court on justice
issues, the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, and the
Central Prison Directorate.
26      James A. Russell, “Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan,” in
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 68–72; and Stephen M. Saideman, “Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan: Minority Government,” in Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, Military Adaptation, 221.
27      The initiative was never implemented. Labbé, interview.
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The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team worked intimately
with Tooryalai Wesa, then governor of Kandahar, and his office.
As the appointed provincial executive officer, Wesa’s direction and
leadership was important to Canada. As such, the team assisted him with
planning, budgeting, and coordinating major projects. In this fashion,
the organization and its efforts were aligned with provincial ministry
projects, plans, and budgets to support the people of Kandahar.
The reconstruction team had a strong relationship with the
Provincial Council.28 As a body of elected representatives who listened
and mediated disputes in the Afghan tradition, the council encouraged
people and the civil society to participate in governance. This effort
provided an important adjunct to the provincial administration by
helping the people find common ground with the government.
District stabilization teams, comprised of small groups of American
and Canadian government advisors with military assistance, worked
closely with their Afghan counterparts outside the provincial capital,
in the district ministries, and alongside district governors to increase
local capacity. The measurable growth of governance between 2010
and 2011 was, in no small part, due to the efforts of these teams of
dedicated professionals.
Moreover, the six policy objectives linked with the Afghanistan
Compact, served as an overarching term of reference for the civilian
components of the mission—for example, Canada created a unique
operational capacity that increased the civilian role in Kandahar.
This expanded whole-of-government approach enabled a more robust
partnership with the Afghan provincial government, and it was
supported by programs financed by Canada’s Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International
Development Agency. Some of these initiatives included the Arghandab
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, which involved one of the largest
dams in Afghanistan; the development of 50 schools; eradicating polio;
improving the primary detention center in the region; training police;
and improving government infrastructure.
As Canada’s plans in Kandahar were achieved, the Canadian staff
of the KPRT gradually relocated to Kabul or returned to Canada. In
January 2011, Canada transferred leadership of the reconstruction team
to the United States as part of the Canadian process of winding down
its activities in Afghanistan. And, Canadians and Americans served
together closely until the end of the Canadian combat mission in 2011
so as to achieve significant progress in both Afghan development
and governance.29
28      Throughout this period, the Chair of the Provincial Council was the powerful half brother
of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, known as AWK. AWK was murdered by
a bodyguard in July 2011. “Bodyguard Kills Hamid Karzai’s Half-Brother,” CTV News, accessed
May 19, 2012.
29      Tim Martin, representative of Canada in Kandahar from August 2010 to July 2011 (speech,
Kandahar Provincial Council, Kandahar City, Afghanistan, March 6, 2011).
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Task Force Kandahar

Canadian and American military forces in the Canadian-led brigade
known as Task Force Kandahar implemented Manley Report-based
initiatives in conjunction with the KPRT to ensure all military activities
were coordinated within a whole-of-government framework. Security
aims were to recruit, equip, and organize community policing; to
train, mentor, and partner with an increasingly independent Afghan
National Army; and to deny insurgents influence on the population.
Governance goals included creating responsible and responsive district
leadership that subordinated to the governor; developing representative
subnational processes, such as community meetings called shuras;
and establishing a capable ministry staff that delivered basic services.
Finally, development objectives included establishing functional district
development committees, village development representation, and
increased economic capacity.
The task force worked toward a number of integrated measures of
effectiveness in its whole-of-government approach. Within the area of
security, it was necessary to ensure adequate numbers of capable Afghan
police who were addressing village requirements and protecting, not
preying on, the people. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
led both combined- and single service operations as well as integrated
command and control, which was responsive to the district governor and
village elders (such as maliks). When examining support to governance,
it was necessary to reinforce and assist with creating responsible and
responsive district governors and staff; representative and functioning
district and village shuras and subnational processes; and provincial
ministry representatives working at district centers and reacting to
village requirements.
The task force developed the support needed to help with the
establishment of functioning district development committees that
represented the needs of local Afghans and managed centrally controlled
funds. In turn, this village development representation connected to
all the development activities that were coordinated through district
governors. This cooperation enabled district governors to meet priorities
set by the district, in conjunction with the villages, and a working rural
and urban interface of markets, transportation, and so on.30

Canadian Whole-of-Government Lessons

The Manley Report resulted in an amalgamation of various
interdepartmental perspectives, objectives, programs, plans, and
activities that directly underpinned the creation of a Canadian wholeof-government approach in Afghanistan over the last few years of the
mission. This concept involved Canadian field partners and members
of the international community as well as Afghan authorities at all
levels. It was creative and responsive to the exigencies of Canada’s most
current intervention. While some detractors argue Canada’s approach
30      Milner, presentation; and Coombs, presentation.
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to whole-of-government activities in Afghanistan has been replete with
flaws, others more optimistically reframe this perspective and note
Canada’s engagement in the region is rich with lessons to be learned.
In early 2011, the Afghanistan whole-of-government lessons-learned
project was launched by the Afghanistan Task Force. Subsequently, the
Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team organized a conference
on the lessons learned to examine the multiagency experiences of the
whole-of-government effort.31 Participants looked at cross department
civil-military binational cooperation, the evolution of the reconstruction
team, and strategic communications, as well as contracting and
implementing a “rule of law.” Representatives utilized the 2010–11
experiences of the whole-of-government team in Kandahar to derive a
series of recommendations for the Afghanistan Task Force:
1. The need to have expertise across the domains of security, governance,
reconstruction, and development was highlighted. Without balanced
civilian expertise and support, the host nation is unable to extend
its influence into the communities. Two areas cited as lacking key
Canadian civilian expertise in the conflict-ridden environment of
Kandahar were agriculture and justice.
2. The need to integrate with other government departments, particularly
the Canadian military prior to the deployment, was brought forward.
Understanding other departmental cultures and modes of operation
would have reduced friction between different organizations, as well
as improved communications and effectiveness.
3. It was thought the binational, civil-military nature of the reconstruction
team was effective. It reached across the province to the districts
and assisted greatly in the handover of structures, programming,
and operations.
4. The need for the deployed civilian field agencies of the Canadian
government to be able to communicate to the media was emphasized.
While the Canadian Department of Defense had great latitude
in dealing with the media, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Canadian International Developmental
Agency did not, with a commensurate negative impact in informing
the Canadian public of their activities and achievements. This disparity
was stark and the Afghanistan Task Force focused considerable effort
toward resolving it. Unfortunately, success was never truly achieved.
5. There is a need to standardize contracting procedures across the
Canadian whole-of-government effort. While the practices of the
Department of National Defense and the Canadian Forces are flexible
31      DND, “3350-1 (JLLO) ‘Report on Kandahar Whole of Government Lessons Learned
Workshop,’ 02 June 2011,” 2; Canada, “Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop, Task Force
Kandahar and Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team,” February 24, 2011; Sara Hradecky,
email message to author, March 10, 2011; and Canada, Afghanistan Task Force, “Lessons
Learned,” 10. David Mulroney, deputy minister responsible for the Afghanistan Task Force,
conceived a series of lessons-learned activities after the formation of the Afghanistan Task Force
that were only possible as a result of the governance framework established by the Manley Report.
Brett Boudreau, email, May 19, 2019.
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and were deemed to represent the best practices, those of other
departments were, at times, seen as problematic and cumbersome.
6. While Canadian expertise was recognized in the area of rule of law,
a more comprehensive and detailed program that would reach to the
districts and their people would have been more efficacious.32
The Afghanistan Task Force later put together the results of
various inputs, like that of the reconstruction team, to create high-level
perspectives on the results of Afghanistan’s whole-of-government
experience. These strategic observations reflected the evolution of
the Afghanistan Task Force and its activities. Leading the list was the
requirement for an interdepartmental assessment to establish clear
national objectives and priorities. Related to this was the requirement
for an interagency planning exercise to create common understanding
and intent, plus establish operational guidance. Directly connected to
the formation of the Afghanistan Task Force was the need to create
coordinating bodies at the political level to produce an integrated
approach across and within departments.
The necessity of enhancing cultural and process understanding
between departments to set the conditions for successful
intergovernmental collaboration was also suggested in a fashion similar
to the recommendations expressed by the reconstruction team. This
cooperation could be achieved through cross-department assignments,
colocation, and shared predeployment preparations.
The need for deployable civilian capability was also highlighted.
Such a resource would need decentralized authorities who were able
to make appropriate and timely decisions and who would be part of
a unified whole-of-government effort from the very beginning. In a
nod to the quarterly reporting process implemented in Afghanistan,
the need for a benchmarking framework to monitor and to report on
whole-of-government activities was also brought out by highlighting the
importance of measuring progress. Finally, the requirement to build a
nuanced and multifaceted engagement strategy to gain and maintain
popular support from the public and partners, which had been lacking
for the KPRT, was emphasized.33
Not apparent in this narrative was the hard work necessary to make
the whole-of-government construct work. These exertions occurred
daily throughout the years of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
The friction produced by integrating dissimilar departments and
organizations was very real, and operationalizing this integrated
approach required the labor and good will of many public servants and
military personnel. Also, critical to success was the strong leadership
from the highest levels, embodied in the structure of the Afghanistan
Task Force. Only in this way did the mission become, and remain, a
whole-of-government effort.34
32      DND, “3350-1 (JLLO)”; and Canada, “Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop.”
33      See Canada, Afghanistan Task Force, “Lessons Learned,” 10.
34      Boudreau, email, May 19, 2019.
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Conclusion

Canadian efforts to build coordinated interdepartmental activities
in Afghanistan evolved in conjunction with the growth of the NATO
mission, national debate, and the end of the combat mission in 2011.
This discussion and the record it generated is wide-ranging and contains
much value from the strategic and tactical perspectives. Points of
immediate importance for future whole-of-government practices can be
derived from this collaboration. Of all this discussion, the need for more
intragovernment contact, understanding, and collaboration prior to such
missions is critical. This need was highlighted by Lieutenant-Colonel
Kimberley Unterganschnigg, Canadian Armed Forces retired, who led
the joint lessons-learned cell in Task Force Kandahar during 2010–11:
Interdepartmental civilian-military cooperation was essential to address
the broad scope of security, governance, reconstruction, and development
activities that were undertaken by the KPRT and TFK in the final year of
Canada’s involvement in Kandahar. Looking back, rather than a strategy
document focused upon fixed signature projects, a more comprehensive
framework and approach to the [whole-of-government] mission that
provided clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each of the departments,
particularly with respect to activities in support of governance and
development, would have improved our effectiveness, as it would have
guided consistent progress over the years.35

Although they have been identified as an essential element of mission
success in documents from the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
Team and the Afghanistan Task Force, integrated effects, nor concrete
recommendations to facilitate whole-of-government understanding and
outcomes, have yet to come to pass in a permanent manner. Even in 2009,
prior to the lessons-learned exercises documented in this discussion,
Canadian development specialist Andy Tamas argued the necessity of
the creation of a “hybrid” organization consisting of “an integrated
team of soldiers, development workers, diplomats and others who can
protect themselves.”36 This organization would be funded and resourced
sufficiently to deploy quickly and to commence working effectively
wherever required, regardless of security concerns to produce integrated
effects. The ability to create, deploy, and sustain such a structure over
the duration of the mission, along with established strategic planning
and coordination mechanisms, would permit Canada to maintain the
skills and relationships so arduously gained in Afghanistan.
Tamas’s ideas support the KPRT and Afghanistan Task Force
conclusions. Twenty-first century interventions require teams of people
that are familiar with each other and their capabilities. In turn, this
suggests establishing integrated professional development systems
and increasing interdepartmental assignments to increase operating
familiarity within the departments of the Canadian government.
These steps, in conjunction with developing whole-of-government
35      Unterganschnigg, “Canada’s Whole of Government Mission,” 16.
36      Andy Tamas, Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan
(Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2009), 219.
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organizations that contain a necessary cross-spectrum of skills and
attributes and that can deploy quickly where ever needed, would increase
Canada’s pool of deployable capabilities. Sadly, none of the lessonslearned have been systemically operationalized in an enduring manner.
As the Canadian government looks toward future involvement in
other fractured environments, it needs to heed the lessons identified from
its contribution in southern Afghanistan, particularly over the last year
of the combat mission. Canada must ensure the observations captured by
the Afghanistan Task Force and the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
Team, as well as the activities of Task Force Kandahar, are addressed to
improve the effectiveness of its future whole-of-government activities.
In order to create success in current operations, such as those in Iraq
and Syria, as well as future interventions, the Canadian lessons identified
over the course of the mission in Afghanistan must be operationalized,
institutionalized, and sustained. Only in this fashion will lessons
identified truly become lessons learned.

